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THE EU LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AGAINST MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLVING GLOBAL STANDARDS
VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS* AND BILL GILMORE**
Abstract This article examines the evolution of the EU anti-money laundering
legislative framework (which in recent years has also included measures to
counter terrorist finance), by focusing in particular on recent legislation such as
the third money laundering Directive and the Regulation on controls of cash enter-
ing the EU, both adopted in 2005. The analysis highlights the relationship between
these instruments and international initiatives in the field (in particular FATF stan-
dards), and addresses the challenges posed to the European Union legislative and
constitutional framework when attempting to accommodate global standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Community and its Member States have participated actively in
the development of international and regional money laundering countermea-
sures from their inception. These include both the United Nations 1988
Convention on drug trafficking and the Council of Europe 1990 money laun-
dering Convention. Also significantly, European Community Member States
(all of the old 15) and the European Commission have participated in the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) either from the commencement of its
operations or shortly afterwards, taking an active part in the development of the
1990 40 Recommendations.1 These international standards were thus quite
influential in the development of the Community response against money laun-
dering. In 1991, the first EC money laundering Directive was adopted,2 intro-
ducing into the Community legal order innovative money laundering
countermeasures which had been developed in the international arena.
Combining the approaches of the UN and the Council of Europe on the one
hand, and the FATF on the other, the Directive followed a two-pronged
approach of criminalization and prevention of money laundering, thus becom-
* Queen Mary, University of London <v.mitsilegas@qmul.ac.uk>.
** University of Edinburgh <Bill.Gilmore@ed.ac.uk>.
1 See WC Gilmore, Dirty money: the evolution of international measures to counter money
laundering and the financing of terrorism (3rd edn, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004) 8990.
2 Council Directive of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the
purpose of money laundering, OJ L166, 28 June 1991, p 77.
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ing the first major regional instrument adopting a near comprehensive anti-
money laundering framework.3
Since then, money laundering countermeasures in the European Union have
developed substantially, and always in parallel with international developments
in the field, in particular initiatives by the FATF. This article will examine the
evolution of the EU anti-money laundering framework (which lately has come
to include measures to counter terrorist finance), by focusing in particular on
recent legislation such as the third money laundering Directive, adopted in 2005,
and the Regulation on controls of cash entering the EU, adopted in the same
year. The analysis will highlight the relationship between the negotiations and
content of these instruments with international initiatives in the field, and
address the challenges posed to the European Union legislative and constitu-
tional framework when attempting to accommodate global standards.
II. ACTION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITYTHE MONEY LAUNDERING
DIRECTIVES
A. The first money laundering Directive and related measures
The 1991 money laundering Directive introduced a definition of money laun-
dering, based on the 1988 UN Convention, and called on Member States to
prohibit such money laundering, at least when it involves the proceeds of drug
trafficking.4 On the preventive side, and following the FATF 1990
Recommendations, it introduced a series of obligations for credit and financial
institutions, including duties to identify customers and keep records, to refrain
from transactions they know or suspect are linked with money laundering, not
to tip off customers that they are being investigated for money laundering, and
a proactive duty to report suspicious transactions to the competent national
authorities.5 Credit and financial institutions would be subject to sanctions
the nature of which was left to Member States to determinein cases of non-
compliance with these duties.6
120 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
3 For a detailed analysis of the Directive see V Mitsilegas, Money laundering counter-
measures in the European Union. A new paradigm of security governance versus fundamental
legal principles (Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2003). The third
strand of the FATF strategy is to strengthen international cooperation. Here separate action under
the Third Pillar has been of significance. Of special relevance in this context are Arts 14 of the
October 2001 Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the
Member States of the European Union, OJ C 326, 21 Nov 2001, 1. For the relevant explanatory
report see, OJC 257, 24 Oct 2002, 1.
4 Art 1 third indent and Art 2 respectively.
5 Arts 48 of the Directive. The mandatory reporting duty went one step ahead of the FATF
Recommendations at the time, which called for financial institutions to be permitted or required
to report suspicions; however, the 1996 revised FATF Recommendations followed the EC model.
See Mitsilegas, (n 3) 73. 6 Art 14.
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The implementation of this regulatory and legislative framework by
Member States took place over a period of time in the 1990s and was closely
monitored by the Commission.7 At the same time, Member States used the
opportunities now offered by the third pillar of the EU Treaty, to complement
the Directives provisions with measures with a stronger criminal law
element.8 Thus, in 1998 the Council adopted a Joint Action on money laun-
dering and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds from crime.9 In the
light of the uncertainty regarding the binding character and nature of Joint
Actions,10 the main provisions of this instrument were repealed three years
later by a Framework Decision on the same subject.11 The Framework
Decision aims at obliging Member States not to make reservations to the 1990
Council of Europe money laundering Convention regarding the confiscation
of proceeds of serious crime (with an exception regarding tax offences) and
the criminalization of the laundering of the proceeds of serious crime.12 It also
takes a step beyond the Joint Action in calling on Member States to introduce
specific penalties for the laundering of the proceeds of serious crime, as
defined above.13 Most Member States (at least from the old 15) had imple-
mented these provisions adequately by 2004.14
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7 See the Commissions two Reports to the Council and the European Parliament on the
implementation of the Directive. First Report, COM (95) 54 final, Brussels 3 Mar 1995; and
Second Report, COM (98) 401 final, Brussels, 21 July 1998.
8 The third pillar of the EU Treaty, covering action in Justice and Home Affairs, was intro-
duced by the Treaty of Maastricht (for an overview see V Mitsilegas, J Monar, and W Rees, The
European Union and Internal Security (Palgrave, Basingstoke/New York, 2003)). It must be
noted that the 1991 Directive pre-dated the Maastricht Treaty and was adopted under thefirst
pillarEC Treaty. On the constitutional implications of this choice at EU level see part IV below.
9 OJ L333, 9 Dec 1998, p 1.
10 Joint Actions were included as a form of Union action in the third pillar in the Maastricht
Treaty. This form of action is not repeated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced
Framework Decisions as a clear form of binding third pillar legislation. For the legal issues aris-
ing from this succession in legislative form, in particular in the context of the 1998 Joint Action
on organized crime, see V Mitsilegas, Defining organised crime in the European Union: the
limits of European criminal law in an area of freedom, security and justice (2001) 26 European
Law Review, 565, 579.
11 Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing,
freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime, OJ L182, 5 July
2001, 1.
12 Art 1(a) and (b) respectively. Serious crime is defined as an offence punishable by depriva-
tion of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year. For States having a mini-
mum threshold for offences in their legal system, serious crime as a predicate of money laundering
covers offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a minimum of more
than six months. In 2005 a new Council of Europe Convention on money laundering and the
financing of terrorism was concluded. See, Council of Europe Treaty Series, No 198. The
Convention and the Council played a full part in the negotiations. Art 52(4) saves relevant
Community and EU rules among the Member States.
13 Art 2. The penalty is deprivation of liberty for a maximum of not less than four years.
14 See Report from the Commission based on Art 6 of the Council Framework Decision of 26
June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of
instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, COM(2004) 230 final, Brussels, 5 April 2004. For an
update see the second Report of the Commission on the subject, COM(2006) 72 final, Brussels 21
Feb 2006.
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As noted above, the 1991 Directive introduced a duty for credit and finan-
cial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the competent national
authorities. However, the Directive did not contain any provisions regarding
the nature, functions and powers of these authorities. Member States were left
with discretion regarding the designation of such authorities, in order for the
reporting system to better reflect the specific legal and socio-political domes-
tic reality. This has led to the development of broadly three models of report-
ing systems in the Union: the independent/administrative model, where
financial institutions report suspicions to an independent unit or a unit based
within a government department (such as the Ministry of Finance); the police
model, where suspicions are transmitted to a police/intelligence agency (such
as NCIS in the UK); and the judicial model, where responsibility lies with the
Public Prosecutors office.15 However, this diversity in national models has
the potential to result in obstacles to cooperation in the light of the different
nature and legal regulation of these units. In order to overcome such obstacles,
Member States adopted a third pillar Decision in 2000 on cooperation between
financial intelligence units.16 The Decision calls on each Member State to set
up a financial intelligence unit, which is defined in accordance with the defi-
nition adopted in 1996 by an ad hoc group of countries and international orga-
nizations called the Egmont Group.17 The Decision aims at boosting
information exchange between national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)
regardless of their nature and states that their performance must not be affected
by their internal status, regardless of whether they are administrative, law
enforcement or judicial authorities.18
B. The second money laundering Directive
Initiatives to combat money laundering have not remained static over the
years. The FATF, established with the aim of promoting effective action
against this phenomenon, has been monitoring closely trends and typologies
in money laundering, as well as the legal and practical effect of its
122 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
15 For an analysis of these models with national examples of such units see V Mitsilegas, New
forms of transnational policing: the emergence of financial intelligence units in the European
Union and the challenges for human rights  Part I (1999) 3(2) Journal of Money Laundering
Control 14760. See also JF Thony, Processing financial information in money laundering
matters: the financial intelligence units (1996) 3 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and
Criminal Justice, 25782.
16 OJ L271, 24 Oct 2000, 4.
17 According to this definition, a financial intelligence unit (FIU) is a central, national unit
which, in order to combat money laundering, is responsible for receiving (and to the extent
permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of
financial information which concern suspected proceeds of crime or are required by national legis-
lation or regulation. See Article 2 of the 2000 Decision. On the Egmont Group, see Gilmore (n
1) 7988 and Mitsilegas (n 15) 1556. Its definition has since been extended to embrace the
financing of terrorism.
18 Art 3. On the Decision, see Mitsilegas (n 3) 1769.
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Recommendations and action by its member States. This resulted, in the mid-
1990s, in the realization that the existing global anti-money laundering frame-
work was not adequate to address the changes in money laundering operations
(resulting, at least in part, from the introduction of money laundering counter-
measures in the first place), the perceived vulnerabilities resulting from tech-
nological advances, or the profits derived from non-drug-related criminal
activity. Taking these factors among others into account, the FATF revised its
40 Recommendations in 1996, with the main aim of extending the list of pred-
icate offences for money laundering, extending the preventive duties beyond
the financial sector, and updating the customer identification system taking
into account new technologies.19 These revisions were followed closely by the
European Commissionitself a FATF memberwhich also monitored
changes in money laundering typologies in the context of its Reports on the
implementation of the 1991 Directive. These changes, coupled with the will to
go hand in handand even one step aheadof the FATF, led the Commission
to table, in 1999, a proposal for a second money laundering Directive, updat-
ing the 1991 instrument.20 In its explanatory memorandum, the Commission
refers in detail to its relationship with the FATF, noting that:
just as the 1991 Directive moved ahead of the original FATF 40
Recommendations in requiring obligatory suspicious transaction reporting, the
European Union should continue to impose a high standard on its Member
States, giving effect to or even going beyond the 1996 update of the FATF 40
Recommendations. In particular the EU can show the way in seeking to involve
certain professions more actively in the fight against money laundering alongside
the financial sector.21
However, this ambitious goal was not easy to achieve. Negotiations began in
the summer of 1999 but dragged on for more than two years. This was mainly
due to concerns by the European Parliament, which was co-legislating with the
Council of Ministers on the Directive, regarding the impact of the extension of
the Directives duties to the legal profession in terms of the right to a fair trial
and the principle of lawyerclient confidentiality.22 Eventually, and in the
post-9/11 era, a compromise was reached at the conciliation stage, and the
second money laundering Directive was adopted in December 2001.23
The Directive introduced amendments to the 1991 text, and the two must
therefore be read together. The influence of FATF standards is evident not
only in the operative text, but also in a number of preambular provisions.24
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19 On the 1996 revisions, see Gilmore (n 1) 1002.
20 COM(1999) 352 final, Brussels 14 July 1999. 21 p 3.
22 For a detailed overview of these issues, the negotiations and the final outcome see Mitsilegas
(n 3) 86102.
23 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 Dec 2001 amend-
ing Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose
of money laundering, OJ L344, 28 Dec 2004, 76.
24 See in particular Recitals 1, 7 (referring specifically to the 1996 revised FATF
Recommendations), 8 and 14.
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The main changes brought about by the Directive were: the extension of pred-
icate offences to include, in a manner reminiscent of the third pillar
Framework Decision on confiscation, serious crime;25 the intensification of
identification duties;26 and the extension of the ratione personae scope of the
Directive.27 The duties prescribed by the 1991 text now apply also to profes-
sions such as auditors, external accountants and tax advisers, estate agents, art
dealers, and to casinos. More controversially, they also apply to lawyers, ie
notaries and other independent legal professionals, when engaged in a series
of specified financial activities.28 To assuage fears that the imposition of such
duties would effectively mean the end of the confidential nature of the
lawyerclient relationship with consequential implications for the concept of
a fair trial, and at the insistence of the European Parliament, the Directive
provides for the possibility of exempting lawyers on a number of occasions
from the duties of suspicious transaction reporting and (not) tipping off.29
However, such exemption of lawyers is not obligatory, but relies upon the
discretion of Member States. Moreover, being the outcome of a political
compromise, these provisionsin particular those relating to the exemption
from reporting duties30would benefit from further clarification. This may
come from the Court of Justice, after a reference for a preliminary ruling from
the Cour dArbitrage of Belgium following a case brought by the Brussels
bar.31 The Belgian court has asked the Court of Justice if the inclusion of
members of the independent legal profession within the scope of the Directive
infringes the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR and, as a
consequence, Article 6(2) TEU.32 The Courts ruling is awaited with interest.
C. The third money laundering Directive
Member States were given 18 months to implement the second money laun-
dering Directive, the deadline being 15 June 2003.33 One would expect that,
124 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
25 This includes drug trafficking, organized crime, fraud and corruptionwith the exception
of corruption, these offences are defined by reference to UN or EU instruments. Serious crime
also includes an offence which may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a
severe sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the penal law of the Member State. But this
definition should be aligned with the one in the 1998 Joint Action (presumably this now means
the 2001 Framework Decision)Art 1(E).
26 Revised Art 3.
27 New Art 2a.
28 See Art 2a(5).
29 Revised Art 6(3) and new Art 8(2). For a detailed analysis of the position of lawyers under
the Directive see Mitsilegas (n 3) 96102 and 14651.
30 Art 6(3) exempts lawyers, auditors and tax advisors with regard to information they receive
from or obtain on one of their clients, in the course of ascertaining the legal position for their client
or performing their task of defending or representing their client in, or concerning, judicial
proceedings, including advice on instituting or avoiding proceedings, whether such information is
received or obtained before, during or after such proceedings.
31 Cour dArbitrage, Arret No 126/2005 of 13 July 2005. See also OJ C243, 1 Oct 2005, 10.
32 ibid. 33 Art 3(1) of the 2001 Directive.
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at the time of writing, the Commission and Member States would be focusing
on how it has been implemented across the EU (of now 25 members).
However, the adoption of a revisedand controversialanti-money launder-
ing Directive as recently as 2001, did not stop the Commission tabling in 2004
a proposal for a third Directive, amending the two earlier texts.34 The main
justification for this proposal has again been the need to update EC law in the
light of new work by the FATF.35 Indeed, in 2003 the FATF issued a revision
of its 40 Recommendations, to take into account developments in money laun-
dering typologies. Revisions were aimed in particular at extending the scope
of predicate offences, providing guidance on customer identification require-
ments, which now must take place on a risk-sensitive basis and take into
account specific categories of individuals in this context (such as politically
exposed persons), focusing on the (mis)use of corporate vehicles, and dealing
specifically with the work of FIUs.36
However, there has been one more reason put forward for the prioritization
of further amendments to the EC anti-money laundering framework: the war
on terror. Following 9/11, the FATF mandate was extended to cover not only
money laundering, but also terrorist finance. This signalled the main element
of the global strategy to undercut terrorist funding, a central component of
which is to extend the anti-money laundering legal and regulatory armoury to
terrorist finance activities. This approach is reflected in a series of eight
Special Recommendations that the FATF adopted in October 2001; a ninth
measure was promulgated in October 2004. While some of these
Recommendations reflect pre-existing commitments undertaken in the frame-
work of the UN and obligations imposed by the Security Council,37 others
refer specifically to the use of the anti-money laundering framework in this
context. Here the focus has been on the monitoring of wire transfers, the regu-
lation of alternative remittance systems, the targeting of cross-border cash
movements by terrorists, and taking steps to reduce the vulnerability of the
non-profit sector to abuse.38
Negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament did not
prove to be as difficult as in the case of the second money laundering
Directive, and agreement was reached after the first reading. The third money
laundering Directive was thus published in November 2005a long text (47
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34 COM(2004) 448 final, 30 June 2004.
35 ibid 3.
36 For a detailed analysis see Gilmore (n 1) 10511.
37 These include the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
and Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), both calling for the criminalization of terrorist
finance.
38 For a detailed analysis see Gilmore (n 1) 1209. See also Gilmore, International Financial
Counterterrorism Initiatives in C Fijnaut, J Woaters, and F Naert (eds), Legal Instruments in the
Fight Against International Terrorism (Brill, Leiden, 2004) 189. On the nature and scope of the
October 2004 initiative on cross-border cash movements see, Financial Action Task Force:
Annual Report 20042005 (FATF, 2005) 8.
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Articles), which repeals the earlier Directives.39 The major changes begin in
the title of the instrument, which now refers to money laundering and terror-
ist financing. The aim of complying with international standards is again
reflected in the Preamble, with specific references to the threat from terror-
ism,40 the need to take into account the work of the FATF41 and the need to
change customer identification provisions in the light of international devel-
opments.42
A number of changes involve the criminal law-related aspects of the
Directive. As with the previous two Directives, this one states that money
laundering is prohibited.43 However, the definition of money laundering is
amended to align the definition of serious crime in the Directive with the one
in the 2001 Framework Decision on confiscation.44 Moreover, the Directive
now also prohibits terrorist financing. The definition is similar, but not iden-
tical to that found in the UN 1999 Convention, and terrorism is formulated in
accordance with the relevant EU Framework Decision.45 Another interesting
addition, that may have criminal law repercussions, is Article 27, which calls
on Member States to protect employees who report suspicions of money laun-
dering or terrorist financing from being exposed to threats or hostile action.
The nature and means of such protection are left unspecified, and the broader
issue is whether the Community has competence to impose this obligation,
which may lead to the inclusion of such employees in protection schemes
under national criminal justice systems, in a first pillar instrument.46
To align the Community framework with FATF-related developments,
major changes have been introduced in the field of customer identification and
due diligence. Chapter II of the Directive is now entitled customer due dili-
gence and comprises no less than 15 Articles,47 many of them expanded from
the earlier text. A new provision is Article 6, which prohibits anonymous
126 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
39 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 Oct 2005 on the
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist
financing, OJ L309, 25 Nov 2005, p 15.
40 Recital 1.
41 Recital 5.
42 Recital 9.
43 On the significance of the use of this terminology, see part IV below.
44 Art 3(5)(f). It is interesting to note that the general reference to corruption in the previous
indent remains unchanged from the 2nd Directive.
45 Art 1(4). Terrorist financing is defined as the provision or collection of funds, by any
means, directly or indirectly, with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that
they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of the offences within the meaning
of Arts 1 to 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating
terrorism. The difference with the UN Convention lies in the mens rea element, where the word-
ing is slightly different (Art 2(1) refers to unlawfully and wilfully collecting), as well as in what
constitutes terrorism.
46 Recital 32 in the Preamble implicitly recognises the potential impact on national systems by
stating that although the Directive cannot interfere with Member States judicial procedures, this
is a crucial issue for the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing
system.
47 Arts 619 of the Directive.
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accounts or anonymous passbooks. This makes explicit a prohibition which
one Member State, Austria, was defying for a large part of the 1990s, result-
ing in the Commission referring the case to Luxembourg and the near-black-
listing of the country by the FATF (these actions were discontinued after
Austrias eventual compliance).48 The provisions on customer identification
have been expanded to introduce various levels of diligence, which may range
from simplified due diligence49 to enhanced due diligence, in particular when
cross-frontier correspondent banking with third countries, transactions with
politically exposed persons, or the use of shell banks is involved.50 This
layering is primarily achieved by the use of the principle of due diligence on
a risk-sensitive basis.51 This is in compliance with the new FATF approach
embraced in 2003, and may be a useful principle in ensuring that the institu-
tions and professions concerned are not unnecessarily overburdened with
obligations.52
On the reporting duties, the most significant change has been the inclusion
in the Directive of express provisions covering financial intelligence units
(FIUs), presumably to follow the express reference to FIUs in the revised
FATF recommendations. Member States are asked to establish FIUs with
specific tasks, and the units are given maximum powers of access to national
databases; however, no data protection provisions accompany this maximum
access.53 Moreover, suspicious transaction reporting is now viewed within the
specific context of FIUs, as the institutions and persons involved must now
send suspicions not to the competent authorities, but to the FIU.54 This also
applies to the case of legal professionals, notwithstanding the fact that the
2001 Directive allowed Member States to make provisions for suspicious
transactions to be transmitted to self-regulatory bodies (eg bar associations)
instead of the competent authorities. The 2005 Directive continues to allow
for this option, but these designated bodies must in such cases forward the
information to the FIU promptly and unfiltered.55 The value of a specific
exemption from the ordinary regime if bar associations are required to trans-
mit the reports unfiltered is by no means self-evident.
On the subject of lawyers, the exception from reporting duties remains.56
However, an important change has been made to the tipping off provision,
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48 See, Gilmore (n 1) 1389. Similar banking practices had existed in a number of new
Member States but had been largely addressed prior to the formulation of the third Directive.
49 Arts 1112. 50 Art 13.
51 Arts 8(2), 11(2) and 13(1).
52 This approach is also reflected in the chapter on performance by third parties (Arts 1419).
Art 14 allows Member States to permit institutions and persons covered by the Directive to rely
on third parties to meet the requirements of customer due diligence under certain conditions.
53 Art 21. According to para 3, Member States must ensure that FIUs have access, directly or
indirectly, on a timely basis, to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that
they require to properly fulfil their tasks.
54 Art 22. 55 Art 23(1).
56 Art 23(2). On similar terms, lawyers may be exempted in some occasions from reporting
when unable to comply with customer due diligence requirementsArt 9(5).
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 20 Dec 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.194
now mainly in Article 28. The controversial reference to the possibility of
Member States exempting lawyers from this obligation, inserted in 2001, has
been deleted. The reason behind this amendment was clarified in the 2004
Commission proposal as follows: The Member State option to allow
members of the professions acting as legal advisors to inform their client that
a report is being made has been dropped as it is not in conformity with the
revised FATF 40 Recommendations.57 Instead, Article 28(6) now states that
where lawyers seek to dissuade a client from engaging in illegal activity, this
will not constitute tipping off within the meaning of the Directive, an exemp-
tion specifically contemplated by the interpretative note to FATF
Recommendation 14. In this context, therefore, the protection of lawyers has
been watered down substantially in comparison with the 2001 Directive.58
It should be noted that the above was by no means the only alteration to the
pre-existing approach to the prohibition on tipping off. One modification, now
reflected in Article 28(1), has been to include, by way of addition, the prohi-
bition of disclosure to a customer or third party that an investigation may be
carried out. Previously the restriction was limited to instances in which an
investigation was already underway. A potential loophole has therefore been
closed off, thus maximizing the protection afforded to the investigation of
possible money laundering and terrorist financing activities. In a similarly
positive manner, paragraph 2 now explicitly provides that the prohibition does
not apply to disclosures made to national competent authorities, including self-
regulatory bodies, or to law enforcement.
Somewhat more contentious are the other exceptions to the basic rule
which now find reflection in the text of this Article. These facilitate, inter alia,
disclosures within financial conglomerates, professional networks and, in
certain cases involving the same customer and transaction, between relevant
institutions or persons. Such disclosures can extend to third countries outside
of the Union subject to the satisfaction of an equivalence test.59 Member
States must inform each other, and the Commission, where they consider that
a third country meets this requirement.60 The Commission is, in turn, empow-
ered to adopt a decision that the country in question does not so qualify.61
These Article 28 provisions, as drafted, also give rise to questions concerning
their compatibility with the 2003 FATF standards in this sphere.
Along with the human rights concerns that arise from these and the FIU
provisions, there are also a number of issues arising from an EU constitutional
law perspective. The FIU provisions in the 2005 Directive coexist with the
128 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
57 COM(2004) 448 final, 6.
58 On this point, see the correspondence between the House of Lords European Union
Committee and the UK Treasury during the scrutiny of the Directive. In particular letter from Lord
Grenfell of 8 Dec 2004 to Stephen Timms and his response of 21 Mar 2005.
59 See Art 28(3)(5).
60 Art 28(7).
61 See Arts 29 and 40(4).
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2000 third pillar Decision on FIUs, which has not been repealed. The rela-
tionship between these two instruments is unclear. Prima facie it could be
argued that the Directive regulates the relationship between the institutions
and persons covered by the Directive, while the Decision covers the relation-
ship between FIUs of the different Member States and their cooperation.
However, there are provisions which overlap, such as the definition of an FIU
(which is broader in the Directive as its work also covers terrorist finance).
Moreover, the existence of Community competence to require, via a first pillar
instrument, Member States to ensure that FIUs have access to, inter alia, police
data, is questionable.
Another important constitutional point involves the increased use of comi-
tology in the Directive. This means that on a number of occasions decisions
on definitions in and amendments to the Directive will not be taken under the
ordinary legislative procedure under which the Directive was adopted (co-
decision between the European Parliament and the Council), but by a commit-
tee chaired by the Commission and consisting of representatives of Member
States.62 This would result in practice in minimal parliamentary scrutiny at
both the European and national level. In the case of the Directive, Article 40
calls for adoption under this procedure by the Commission and the Committee
on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance established by
Article 41, of a number of measures in order to take account of technical
developments in the field. These include in particular clarifications of the tech-
nical aspects of definitions of concepts such as beneficial ownership, politi-
cally exposed persons, business relationship, and shell bank.63 These concepts
are central to the delimitation of the duties set out by the Directive in applying
the FATF standards, and their definition may have significant implications for
the liability of the institutions and persons involved, but also for the funda-
mental rights of the individuals covered by these (such as politically exposed
persons).62a In view of the issues at stake, the use of comitology in this context
may not provide adequate safeguards for transparency and the protection of
fundamental rights. It remains to be seen how these, and the other Directive
provisions, will be implemented. In the light of criticism of legislative and
regulatory overload, the deadline for implementation is 15 December 2007.64
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62a A first example of comitology implementation has been the Commission Directive
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III. ASSOCIATED INITIATIVES
While the third Directive enjoys pride of place in the efforts of the Union to
prevent money laundering and to curb the financing of terrorism, it is not compre-
hensive in its coverage. Accordingly a range of associated initiatives have been
taken in order to ensure the appropriate satisfaction of international standards.
The catalyst for such measures has been the FATF Special
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. As noted above, these were first
formulated in October 2001 in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks65
and were supplemented in October 2004. Of the nine Special
Recommendations, four are closely associated with the FATFs preventative
approach; namely, those relating to alternative remittance systems (SRVI),
wire transfers (SRVII), non-profit organizations (SRVIII), and cash couriers
(SRIX). In all but one instance the strategy for ensuring compliance has
involved, or envisages, a Community legislative response. The sole exception
relates to SRVIII on non-profit organizations.66 While consideration was
given to the use of a binding Regulation to guarantee the desired level of
enhanced transparency in the non-profit or charitable sector,67 it was eventu-
ally decided to place particular reliance on the formulation of a framework for
a Code of Conduct.68 The Justice and Home Affairs Council on 1 and 2
December 2005 took note of the relevant Commission Communication. It also
articulated five principles which Member States should take into account
when implementing counterterrorism measures in this vital sphere of activity.
They are that:
 Safeguarding the integrity of the non-profit sector is a shared responsi-
bility of States and non-profit organizations.
 Dialogue between Member States, the non-profit sector and other rele-
vant stakeholders is essential to build robust defences against terrorist
finance.
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65 See, eg, Gilmore, (n 1) 1239.
66 It is worded as follows: Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that
relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are
particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused: (i) by terrorist
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67 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the Prevention of and the Fight against Terrorist Financing, COM(2004) 700 final, Brussels, 20
Oct 2004, para 5.2.
68 Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the European
Economic and Social Committee: The Prevention of and Fight against Terrorist Financing through
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 Member States should continually develop their knowledge of their non-
profit sector, its activities and vulnerabilities.
 Transparency, accountability and good governance lie at the heart of
donor confidence and probity in the non-profit sector.
 Risks of terrorist finance are managed best where there are effective,
proportionate measures for oversight.69
Of the remaining initiatives designed to give effect to the relevant FATF
Special Recommendations, only one had, at the time of writing, completed the
legislative process, namely, the Regulation of 26 October 2005 on controls of
cash entering or leaving the Community.70 It will apply from 15 June 2007.
As paragraph 4 of the preamble makes clear, the text has been designed with
the requirements of FATF SRIX on cross-border cash movements by terrorists
and criminals firmly in mind.
The physical cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable
instruments by money launderers and other criminals is by no means new.
Indeed, the original 1990 version of the FATF Recommendations urged study
of the feasibility of measures to detect or monitor cash at international
borders.71 A similar light touch approach was carried over into the 199672 and
200373 revisions of the FATFs 40 Recommendations. However, more recent
study of the use of such methods by terrorist financiers (eg by Jemaah Islamiah
in relation to the Bali and Jakarta bombings) resulted in the conclusion that a
more prescriptive approach was now warranted. This process culminated in
October 2004 when the FATF issued SRIX. As has been noted elsewhere, this
calls upon jurisdictions to:
 implement a declaration or disclosure system for detecting physical
cross-border transportations of currency and bearer monetary instru-
ments;
 give competent authorities the legal power to stop or restrain currency
and monetary instruments that are suspected of being related to money
laundering or terrorist financing, or that are falsely declared or disclosed;
 have effective sanctions available to deal with people who make false
declarations or disclosures; and
 confiscate currency and monetary instruments that are related to money
laundering or terrorist financing.74
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At the same time FATF Recommendation 19 was amended to bring it into line
with the new standard. The FATF has also issued both an interpretative note
and a best practices paper to assist members of the international community in
the effective implementation of SRIX.
Of the two options provided by the FATF, the Regulation has adopted the
obligatory declaration and not the disclosure system. Pursuant to Article 3(1)
any natural person carrying cash of a value of EUR10,000 or more must
declare that sum when entering or leaving the Community. That declaration
must in turn contain details on a number of matters ranging from identifier
information concerning the declarant to the provenance and intended use of
the cash.75 Information may also be recorded where the value falls below the
threshold but there are indications of illegal activities associated with the
movement of cash.76 It should be noted that, as envisaged by SRIX, the
Regulation defines cash very broadly. It means:
(a) bearer-negotiable instruments including monetary instruments in bearer
form such as travellers cheques, negotiable instruments (including
cheques, promissory notes and money orders) that are either in bearer
form, endorsed without restriction, made out to a fictitious payee, or other-
wise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery and incomplete
instruments (including cheques, promissory notes and money orders)
signed, but with the payees name omitted.
(b) currency (banknotes and coins that are in circulation as a medium of
exchange).77
Other provisions address such matters as the powers of competent national
authorities,78 the exchange of information with other Member States or the
Commission79 as well as with third countries,80 and the introduction of effec-
tive, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.81
Still progressing through the legislative machinery in Brussels are the
initiatives relevant to wire transfers and alternative remittance systems. The
former is both better known and further advanced. This takes the form of a
proposal for a Regulation on information on the payer accompanying transfers
of funds.82 This was brought forward by the Commission in July 2005 and
EcoFin agreed on a general approach that December.83 As both the explana-
tory memorandum and the preamble to the draft text both note, the explicit
purpose of this initiative is to transpose SRVII on wire transfers into
Community legislation.
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83 Press Release, 2698th Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 6 Dec
2005, 14763/05 (Presse 311), 15.
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As has been noted elsewhere, the use of wire transfers in money launder-
ing schemes has been well known in law enforcement circles for many years.
Indeed, on various occasions in the 1990s the FATF engaged in discussions
with the industry in an effort to ensure that a meaningful audit trail would be
available to the authorities in relevant cases.84 In the wake of the terrorist
attacks against the United States in September 2001and the associated
reliance of the hijackers on relatively small value transfers to fund their activ-
itiesthe issue was subjected to urgent reconsideration. The outcome was
SRVII which reads thus:
Countries should take measures to require financial institutions, including money
remitters, to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name,
address and account number) on funds transfers and related messages that are
sent, and the information should remain with the transfer or related message
through the payment chain.
Countries should take measures to ensure that financial institutions, including
money remitters, conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspicious activ-
ity funds transfers which do not contain complete originator information (name,
address and account number).
Following consultations with the private sector an interpretative note was
issued in February 2003 to provide further guidance on the implementation of this
new standard. However, it soon became apparent that both a range of technical
issues and the matter of the treatment of batch transfers would require reconsid-
eration if this initiative was to avoid unnecessarily negative consequences for the
operation of these payments systems. A revised interpretative note was then
issued by the FATF on 10 June 2005.85 This recognizes that it will take some
time to put in place consequential legislative, regulatory and practical changes.
An international deadline of the end of December 2006 was set for this purpose.
In the words of Article 1 of the draft Regulation, it establishes rules on
information to accompany transfers of funds, concerning the payers of those
funds, for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prose-
cution of money laundering and terrorist financing. As envisaged by the
FATF revised interpretative note, it exempts credit and debit card transactions
and transfers between payment service providers acting on their own behalf.86
While the FATF draws a distinction between cross-border and domestic wire
transfers, this is reflected in the draft Regulation in somewhat differing regimes
for transfers within the Community and those which involve other States and
territories.87 As the Commission has explained, simplified information (the
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account number of the payer or unique identifier) has to be applied to transfers
of funds within the EU, whereas complete information on the payer has to be
applied to transfers of funds between the EU and other jurisdictions.88 This
fundamental distinction is then built into the various parts of the draft text but
is particularly prominent in Chapter II (Obligations for the payment service
provider of the payer) and Chapter III (Obligations for the payment service
provider of the payee).
While a detailed discussion of this initiative lies beyond the scope of this
article,89 it should be noted that it has been heavily influenced both by the
general terms of SRVII and by the much more detailed guidance to be found
in the interpretative note.90 By way of illustration it envisages that the
Regulation will apply from the same date as the international standard (1
January 2007)91 in order to establish a coherent approach in the field of
combating money laundering and terrorist financing . . .92 Interestingly,
Article 16 of the draft acknowledges the dynamic nature of policy develop-
ment in this area of concern by providing a simplified amendment procedure
to take account of certain categories of change in international standards in
future years.
The final legislative initiative of relevance for present purposes is
contained in Title II of the December 2005 proposal for a Directive on
payment services in the internal market. This is intended, inter alia, to trans-
pose a central element of SRVI of the FATF into Community law in a uniform
manner.93
The objective of this Special Recommendation is to increase the trans-
parency of payment flows by ensuring that jurisdictions impose consistent
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures on all forms
of money/value transfer systems particularly those traditionally operating
outside the conventional financial sector and not currently subject to the FATF
Recommendations.94 There has been concern for some time within specialist
anti-money laundering circles that informal systems, often referred to as alter-
native remittance services, or underground or parallel banking systems, were
vulnerable to abuse by criminal elements. Such concerns were heightened
after September 2001 in the light of further study on the typologies of terror-
ist financing.95 A central feature of SRVI is to require all providers of money
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88 ibid 4.
89 The draft Regulation raises important issues related inter alia to the imposition of criminal
sanctions for non-compliance (issues of first pillar competence may also arise in this context), and
data protection. See also the concerns raised recently by the House of Lords EU Committee
letter by Lord Grenfell to Ivan Lewis MP, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, 23 Mar 2006.
90 See, eg, para 3 of the preamble. 91 Art 20.
92 Preamble, para 22.
93 COM(2005) 603 final, Brussels, 1 Dec 2005, 7.
94 Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VI: Alternative Remittance, para 1. Text
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or value transfer services to be licensed or registered and become subject to
the full range of countermeasures envisaged in the FATF standards. The new
licence system for payment institutions provided for in Title II of the proposed
Directive should be viewed in that light. It will be noted, however, that the
Commission has, perhaps controversially, adopted a gradualist approach in
this regard.96 In its words: The introduction of a derogation for certain cate-
gories of money remitters shall facilitate the gradual migration of these
providers from the unofficial economy to the official sector.97
IV. KEEPING UP WITH GLOBAL STANDARDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR EU
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. General
So far, the symbiotic relationship between the development of money laun-
dering countermeasures in international fora and the evolution of such
measures in the EC/EU has been amply demonstrated. Apart from the impor-
tant issues that the adoption of such standards by the Community raises
regarding the protection of fundamental rights, the willingness of the
Community institutions and Member States to keep up with, but also to go
beyond, international initiatives by Community law, has resulted in a series of
constitutional dilemmas for the European Community.
B. The money laundering Directives
The first such dilemma was posed at the time of the negotiations of the first
money laundering Directive. This was in 1990, before the Maastricht Treaty
was adopted and entered into force. Any legislation dealing with money laun-
dering countermeasures would thus have to be adopted with a legal basis
under the EC Treaty. With money laundering legislation being, arguably,
predominantly of a criminal law nature and having as its primary objective the
combating of crime, finding a legal basis in the EC Treaty would seem a diffi-
cult task. Moreover, even if an appropriate legal basis was found, a further
constitutional obstacle would be the limits of Community lawat least at the
timein accommodating criminal law, and the limits of EC competence to
adopt legislation on criminal offences and sanctions.98
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In the context of the 1991 Directive, a solution was found on both counts.
It was deemed that preventing money laundering was essential to ensure the
integrity of the Community financial system and the internal marketthus a
dual free movement/internal market legal basis was eventually used.99 This
was notwithstanding the fact that the primary objective of the Directive was of
a criminal law nature. However, the limits of Community competence to
define criminal offences and impose criminal sanctions become evident in the
negotiation of the Directive. While the Commission originally proposed that
money laundering should be treated as a criminal offence under the Directive,
Member States reacted in the Council, taking the view that the Community
had no such competence. However, and since foundational money laundering
legislation without some sort of sanction for money laundering per se is hard
to conceive, a compromise was reached and money laundering was not crim-
inalized by the Directive, but prohibited. In this way, Community law did not
impose an express obligation on Member States to act in criminal matters, but
in reality left them with little choice. A Declaration affirming the criminaliza-
tion of money laundering was attached to the Directive and money laundering
was soon de facto criminalized in all Member States.100
Since the adoption of the 1991 Directive, the EU constitutional landscape
has changed significantly. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the third pillar,
granting express powers to the Union (but not the Community) to adopt legis-
lation in criminal matters. In the field of money laundering, issues of confis-
cation and criminalization of the laundering of the proceeds of serious crimes
have thus been dealt with under the third pillar. The third pillar also provided
a legislative avenue for the adoption of the 2000 Decision on financial intelli-
gence units, thus acknowledging that FIU cooperation is an activity that falls
within the third, and not the first, pillar. This was done notwithstanding the
fact that many FIUs are not based within police authorities in Member States.
At the same time, and in spite of the opportunities offered by the third pillar,
the second money laundering Directive followed exactly the same pattern as
its 1991 predecessor, by continuing to prohibit money laundering and call-
ing on Member States to bring their legislation (on the prohibited money
laundering) into line with the third pillar 1998 Joint Action on confiscation.
This cross-pillar complexity was exacerbated by the third money launder-
ing Directive. While the prohibition formula has not changednotwith-
standing the Commissions attempt to introduce criminal law in the draftthe
Directive aligned the definition of the prohibited money laundering with the
2001 Framework Decision on confiscation. In an attempt to be aligned with
the revised FATF Recommendations, it introduced provisions on the role and
powers of FIUs, including powers of access to national police records, a
136 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
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matter arguably falling within the third, and not the first, pillar. Moreover, as
said above, the Directive provisions coexist, and at times overlap, with the
third pillar Decision on FIU cooperation.
Matters, at least regarding the money laundering offences and Community
competence, may take a different turn following the recent ECJ ruling on envi-
ronmental crime.101 Based on the view that the Community does not have
competence to introduce criminal offences and sanctions, the Council adopted
a Directive on environmental crime defining the behaviour in question, and a
third pillar Framework Decision on environmental crime introducing criminal
offences and sanctions. The Commission challenged the validity of the third
pillar measure arguing that the criminal offence provisions should have been
adopted under the first pillar, as they would contribute to the attainment of a
Community objective, ie the protection of the environment. The Council,
supported by no less than 11 Member States, argued that criminal law falls
within the third and not the first pillar and that introducing such legislation in
the first pillar would be in breach of the principle of conferral in EC law.
However, in a seminal judgment, the Court found for the Commission and
annulled the Framework Decision.102
Following that judgment, the Commission published a Communication argu-
ing that the Courts ruling meant that a number of measures adopted in similar
style must be recast.103 This list includes the third money laundering Directive
and the 2001 Framework Decision on confiscation. This is notwithstanding the
fact that the Directive introduced a provision aligning the definition of serious
crime with that of the Framework Decision. Given this development, the de
facto criminalization of money laundering in all EU Member States, and the fact
that the only aspect of the Framework Decision which could fall under the first
pillar in this context is arguably the money laundering offences article, the
Commissions proposal would have little practical value. But it would have the
symbolic value of introducing criminal offences and sanctions on money laun-
dering in the first pillar. Member States appear reluctant to follow the
Commissions proposals beyond environmental crime, and have agreed to intro-
duce a special procedure to be followed within the Council when the
Commission tables proposals involving measures relating to the criminal law of
Member States in the future.104 It remains to be seen if the Commissions stance
will lead to either a paralysis in the implementation of the Directive or going
back to the drawing board for a fourth money laundering Directive.105
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C. Controls of cash
Problems of legal basis arise also in the context of the cash controls
Regulation, introducing into the Community legal order FATF standards on
the detection of physical cash movements.106 The primary purpose of these
measures is to combat terrorism via tackling terrorist finance, which would
point to a third, rather than a first, pillar legal basis. The content of the
Regulation is also linked more with enforcement purposes, involving controls
and the obligation of those entering or leaving the Community to declare sums
of cash under certain conditions. After a change in the title and the content of
the Commissions initial proposal,107 the Regulation was adopted under the
first pillar, with a dual legal basis of Articles 95 and 135 TEC. However, the
adequacy of either of these two provisions, or both of them in combination, as
a legal basis for this measure is questionable.
Article 135 deals with customs cooperation in the Community. The provi-
sion explicitly states that such measures will not concern the application of
national criminal law or the national administration of justice. Furthermore, as
seen above, the content of the Regulation has been watered down to exclude
interference with national criminal law. However, even in its finally adopted
form, the Regulation still involves cooperation between national customs
authorities and does not prime facie cover strictly national currency controls
at the border of individual Member States, which are the cases envisaged in
the Regulation.108 The Regulation essentially involves action at the external
border of the Community. However, the EC Treaty provisions specifically
designed to provide a legal basis for Community measures on border controls
(principally Article 62 TEC) , specifically involve controls on persons, and not
capital.
Article 95 on the other hand is aimed at ensuring the smooth functioning of
the internal market. Using the rationale of the money laundering Directives,
the Preamble to the Regulation claims that the introduction of proceeds of
crime in the financial system is detrimental to its functioning; therefore, the
measure is necessary to safeguard the integrity of the internal market.109
However, the link of this objective with the content of this measure is also
tenuous. If money laundering involves large sums of money and sophisticated
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transactions which might jeopardize the financial system, terrorist finance
involves smaller sums, in cash (specifically covered by the measure in ques-
tion), which rarely enter the financial system in the first place. It is difficult to
see how cash enteringor leavingthe Community in this manner will jeop-
ardize the soundness of the financial system, and thus the internal market. As
the Court of Justice has ruled, the measures referred to in Article 95(1) are
intended to improve the conditions for the establishment of the internal market
and must genuinely have that object, actually contributing to the elimination
of obstacles to the free movement of goods or to the freedom to provide
services, or to the removal of distortions of competition.110 This test is not
however met with the cash controls Regulation. Moreover, any objective of
safeguarding the internal market is incidental to the primary objective of this
measure,111 which is combating and preventing terrorism.112
Similarly, Article 308 TEC is not an appropriate legal basis, as it is trig-
gered if action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community, and if the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.
Combating terrorism is not a Community objective,113 but it falls within the
broader third pillar objective of developing the Union as an area of freedom,
security and justice.114 It is thus arguable that the appropriate legal basis for
such measure would therefore lie in the third, and not the first, pillar.
V. CONCLUSION
The European Union has made great efforts to keep up to speed with, if not
abreast of, global initiatives to counter money laundering and terrorism
finance by both taking an active part, in the form of the Commission and some
Member States, in international fora shaping global standardssuch as the
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FATFand by attempting to implement such standards very soon after their
adoption. The latter task has not always been devoid of legal and constitutional
difficulties, touching mainly upon issues of the competence of the EC/EU to
adopt specific global standards, but also upon issues of protection of civil
liberties and fundamental rights, as the fight against money laundering and
terrorist finance is increasingly viewed as a security issue. The largely uncrit-
ical adoption by the EU, in the form of binding legislation, of global soft law
standards raises questions of both the legitimacy of EU action and the compat-
ibility of the new legislation with fundamental rights and EU constitutional
principles. Those questions may proliferate in the light of the continuing
momentum to align the EU framework against money laundering and terrorist
finance with FATF standards.
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